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UNDER THE UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT
The Uniform Single Publication Act,' promulgated in 1952 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
2 is
a narrow gateway at the threshold of a broad area of rapidly develop-
ing and deeply intriguing legal problems. An awareness of the
numerous and constantly expanding media of mass communication
which surrounds us should suffice to create an appreciation for the vast
amount of harm which could result from a tortious publication by any
of them. This increasing possibility for harm has led to an enlargement
of the scope of legal protection against improper publications. 3
Prior to the year 89o,4 no court had granted relief for the invasion
of a right of privacy, but since that time it has become a separate and
distinct basis for tort liability and is rejected now in only three states.5
Other actions such as slander of title, disparagement of property, trade
libel, and the like have arisen, thus endowing property interests with
a protection similar to that afforded our persons.6 Considering the
possibilities of harm to an individual on the one hand and the in-
equity to the publisher on the other, it is dear that the questions
arising from the application of legal rules with regard to publications
are of extreme importance.
The Uniform Single Publication Act is an attempt to cope with
29C U.L.A. 173 (1952).
2These Commissioners, appointed by the governors of their respective states,
meet annually to consider acts which have been drafted by committees. Acts are
carefully considered by at least two annual conferences before they are approved.
Explanation, 9C U.L.A. vii (1952).
3One writer, in dealing with a single facet of the problem, lists at least five
"kinds of harm" from which the individual must be protected by government re-
strictions on mass communications. Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in
the Press, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1946).
"This is the date of the famous article by Warren and Brandeis which advo-
cated the recognition of a separate right of privacy. Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (i8go).
GHenry v. Cherry & Webb, 3o R.I. 13, 73 At. 97 (1909); Milner v. Red River
Valley Pub. Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (rex. Civ. App. 1952); Judevine v. Benzies-Mon-
tayne Fuel 9- Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936). The right of pri-
vacy has been recognized in .twenty jurisdictions and has been limited by statute in
three. Some jurisdictions have not ruled squarely on this question. Prosser, Torts
637 (2d ed. 1955)-
Prosser, Torts 760 (2d ed. 1955).
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some of the difficulties arising from a widely circulated defamatory
publication. This act limits a plaintiff to one cause of action for a
single general publication of a newspaper, magazine, broadcast, or
other communication. It also provides that a judgment in any jurisdic-
tion will bar further action and that the recovery in this one action
should include damages for injury in all jurisdictions. The desira-
bility of pin-pointing a primary cause of action in the case of a gen-
eral defamatory utterance, thereby enabling all concerned to determine
correctly when and where the injury occurred, can scarely be denied.
The Uniform Single Publication Act, however, does not dearly accom-
lilish this objective.
A question arises in that the act does not purport on its face to
regulate the problem of a suit resulting from the circulation of a
defamatory item after the statute of limitations has run on the original
publication.7 Suppose, for instance, that a newspaper is sold from
stock after the statute of limitations would have barred suit on the
original publication of that edition, or that late copies of a magazine
are mailed subsequent to the barring of an action on the first distribu-
tion. Is a plaintiff permitted to select the particular communication
upon which he chooses to sue, or should he be limited to the orginial
publication?s These hypothetical situations differentiated from an
instance in which there is a distinct republication, a new and separate
utterance, which clearly gives rise to a new cause of action.9
Although modern devices have made the problem more acute, the
so-called common law rule has come to us from Duke of Brunswick v.
The applicable sections are as follows:
"§ i No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for
libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single
publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or
book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast
over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any
action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all
jurisdictions.
"§ 2. A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon the sub-
stantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single publication or
exhibition or utterance as described in Section i shall bar any other action for
damages by the same plaintiff against the same defendant founded upon the same
publication or exhibition or utterance." 9 C U.L.A. 173 (1952).8If the former, a shrewd plaintiff is encouraged to delay asserting his right until
the moment the suit will be most profitable to him and most vexing to the defen-
dant. Furthermore, an unwary or perhaps completely innocent publisher, receiving
no complaint of any alleged libel, might be lulled into committing a new act of
publication. Obtaining evidence of a sale of a copy of the offending material
shortly before the institution of suit would nullify the effect of a statute of limitations
as a statute of repose.
053 C.J.S., Libel and Slander §§ 83-85 (1948).
STATUTORY COMMENTS
Harmer,'0 an English case decided over a century ago. The rule of
this case has been said to be that every sale or delivery of a single copy
is a distinct publication and a separate basis for liability.". In short, this
is a multi-publication rule. The plaintiff in the case, hearing that
certain defamatory statements, printed in a newspaper many years
before, were circulating, sent his servant to purchase a copy of the old
paper from the printer. Upon the sale of the paper to the servant, the
plaintiff sued the printer for libel. The court, unimpressed by the de-
fendant's plea of the statute of limitations, held for the plaintiff, bas-
ing its decision solely on the sale to the servant. Some cases have fol-
lowed this rule.12 Although it is said to be fully endorsed by the Re-
statement of Torts,13 it is doubtful whether the Restatement contem-
plates the adoption of such a principle.
14
Recognizing the differences in the situation involving the Duke of
Brunswick in 1849 and that of a modem publisher, the courts have
limited the scope of what is meant by a "publication." In Means v.
MacFadden Publications,5 for instance, the court held that the sale
from newsstands of old copies of a magazine did not constitute a re-
publication, so that the suit was barred because the statute of limita-
tions had run on the original publication of the issue. The court
pointed out that if the plaintiff's contention were correct, "the Statute
of Limitations would never toll; certainly as long as there was in ex-
istence, an issue of these magazines which was capable of being passed
about or sold."' 6
1014 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1848), hereinafter called the Duke of Bruns-
wick case.
"Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 961 (1953). See also
Odgers, Libel and Slander 132, 139 (6th ed. 1929); Newell, Slander and Libel §§ 175,
192o (4th ed. 1924).
2Central of Ga. Ry. v. Sheftall, 18 Ga. 865, 45 S.E. 687 (19o3); Staub v. Van
Benthuysen, 43 La. 294 (1884); Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N.Y. 495 (1878).
12"This rule has received the unqualified acceptance of the Restatement of
Torts, and there are American jurisdictions in which it is still the last word of the
courts." Prosser, Torts 599 (2d ed. 1955).
2Section 578 of the Restatement of Torts appears to indicate that a fresh tort is
committed each time a libelous article is reprinted or redistributed, but it is un-
likely that its writers had in mind the problem involving separate sales of the same
defamatory material by the original publisher. Even Prosser admits that "The con-
text makes it clear, however, that the language is directed at the liability of those
who repeat defamation, and that no thought was given to the problem of separate
sales or communications by the same defendant." Id. at n. 32.
' 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
'Od. at 995. In obtaining the same result, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
reasoned: "Since the gravamen of the offense is not the knowledge by the plaintiff
nor the injury to his feelings but the degrading of reputation, the right [to bring
suit] accrued as soon as the paper was exhibited to third persons in whom alone
1958 ]
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A fact situation not unlike that involving the Duke of Brunswick
was presented in Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons.17 Several thousand
copies of a book published by the defendant had been sold in 1941
and the followihg year, but sales had dwindled until only 6o copies were
sold in the year preceding July 2, 1946, the date of plaintiff's action.
The court held that this action, based on the sale of one or more of
these 6o copies, was barred by the one year statute of limitations. It
follows that the cause of action must have arisen at some earlier time,
perhaps at the time of the original publication or at the time of the
last printing.' s The court dearly repudiated the old multi-publication
concept. The majority of American courts now appear to follow this
more modern view in problems evolving from statutes of limitations. 19
In the majority of American jurisdictions the multi-publication
rule has also fallen into disfavor as applied to questions of venue.
20
Courts following the multi-publication rule allow suits to be brought
in any county or district in which the newspaper or other publication
was circulated, regardless of where the paper was printed or the parties
resided.2 ' There developed, however, a "tendency of the courts to
place a practical limitation upon the exercise of the plaintiff's right
under the common law rule."22 In cases where it appeared to be con-
venient, and not otherwise improper, a change of venue to the county
of publication was allowed.23 In one instance the court allowed the de-
fendant's motion to consolidate sixty-two separate suits, one from each
county of the state, into a single suit in the county where the paper
was published, commenting that plaintiff's action appeared to be
"merely vexatious and vindictive." 24 This situation clearly falls within
the uniform act.
In the face of increasingly confusing jurisdictional and substantive
such repute is resident. The tort is then complete even though the damage may
continue or even accumulate." Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss.
90, 14 So. 2d 344, 347 (1943).
17298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
'One view is that any affirmative act of re-creating the defamation, such as
a reprinting, should create a new cause of action. See Note, 20 Texas L. Rev. 640
(1942). Under this concept, a cause of action would have arisen at the last printing.
1 Prosser, Torts 599 (2d ed. 1955).
2DIbid.
2Haskell v. Bailey, 63 Fed. 873 (4th Cir. 1894); Vitola v. Bee Pub. Co., 66 App.
Div. 582, 73 N.Y. Supp. 273, 277 (ist Dep't igoi) (dictum); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 9o8
(1925).
2Annot., 37 A.L.R. 9o8, 909 (1925).
nGriffin v. Olean Times Pub. Co., 126 N.Y. Supp. 11o2 (Sup. Ct. gii); Mac-
Cormac v. Tobey, io9 App. Div. 581, 96 N.Y. Supp. 302 (ist Dep't 1905); Nicholson
v. Lothrop, 3 Johns. R. 139 (N.Y. 18o8).
24Percy v. Seward, 6 Abb. Pr. 326, 327 (N.Y. 1858).
STATUTORY COMMENTS
problems and a general dissatisfaction with the old rule, the courts
of some states, notably New York and Alabama, have developed a rule
stating frankly that the publication of a single edition of a newspaper
does not create numerous causes of action each complete in itself, but
rather that a single cause of action for the defamatory publication is
created, with the extent of the newspaper's circulation going to the
question of damages. 25 In Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston,26 the
Supreme Court of Alabama distinguished between the "damage or
hurt" incurred by the wide circulation of the paper, and the "injuria,"
or legal wrong which "caused" the "damage or hurt. ' 27 The court rea-
soned that the legal wrong occurred in the county of original publica-
tion and that publications in other counties, although contributing to
the overall damage, merely increased the graivty of the original injury.
This established a single publications rule for Alabama without the
necessity of statute.
In the New York case of Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers,28 no
theory was propounded in justification of the change from the old rule.
The court, apparently feeling that the desirability of the single publi-
cation rule outweighed the handicap of meager authority, blandly
quoted a criminal decision, which in itself represented a sharp de-
parture from the common law, to the effect that "in publication of a
defamatory article in a newspaper publicly circulated there is but one
publication, and that at the place where the newspaper is published." 29
The courts of some states have seemingly thus far escaped without
haing had to rule upon this problem. In Hartmann v. Time, Inc.30 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals commented upon the "distinct cleav-
age" in the libel laws of the various states and noted that it could find
nAge-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Wolfson
v. Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938).
512o7 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921).
--The court goes on to say, "These old common-law principles undoubtedly
had their origin in relation to the single acts of individuals, in a primitive society,
and cannot, either as a matter of principle or common sense, be applied without
qualification to the the publication of modern newspapers." Id. at 196.
'!254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938).
-Id. at 642. Actually two cases are cited by -he court, but the first, Fried, Men-
delson 8, Co. v. Edmund Halstead, Ltd., 203 App. Div. 113, 115, 196 N.Y. Supp. 285,
287 (ist Dep't 1922), relies upon United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227 (D. Ind. igog),
for the statement quoted. The Smith case involved a criminal action brought in
Indianapolis against a paper printed there. The court held that the defendants
must be prosecuted in Indiana rather than in Washington, D. C., where several
copies had been mailed, but the rationale of the case does not appear to be based on
a single publication concept. See Annot. 37 A.L.R. 908, 914 (1925); Annot., 49
L.R.A. (N.s.) 941, 942 (1914).
00166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947).
1958]
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only a "chemical trace" indicating the substantive law of Pennsylvania,
which it was bound to apply. The plaintiff in this case alleged that the
publishers of Life magazine had libeled him by publications through-
out "the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, throughout the United
States, in most of the civilized countries of the world and to the armed
forces of the United States overseas." 3 ' The case presented a complicat-
ed situation encompassing problems of jurisdiction, statutes of limita-
tions and conflicts of laws, which go beyond the scope of this comment,
but which graphically illustrate the inadequacies of present law in this
field. The conflict of laws rule of the forum32 required that the law of
many jurisdictions be considered,3 3 and so the court of appeals returned
the action to the district court with directions to ascertain the law of
each of these jurisdictions.
Clearly, if every sale, delivery, or communication of defamatory mat-
ter constitutes a separate publication as indicated by the Duke of
Brunswick case,3 4 the publisher of a nation-wide communication might
find himself confronted with at least fifty separate suits, one for each
state including Alaska, and the District of Columbia, not to mention
possible causes of action arising in the territories.3 5 The English court
that formulated the multi-publication rule was concerned with only
one jurisdiction, and with publications in a society quite different from
ours today. If every sale of a newspaper or magazine, or as a parallel,
every radio or television broadcast, or movie showing, could give rise
to a separate cause of action today, the results would be farcical.3 6
Id. at II.
3'This was a diversity of citizenship case, so the federal court applied the
law, including the conflict of laws rules, of the state in which it was sitting. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
nThe action of libel is transitory and as such may be brought beyond the
jurisdiction wherein the cause of action arose. A knotty conflict of laws question
arises in connection with the choice of the jurisdiction whose law is to be applied.
For discussion of this phase of multi-state libel, see Prosser, Interstate Publication,
51 Mich. L. Rev. 959 (1953); Notes, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. ioo6 (1953); 35 Va. L. Rev.
627 (1949).
U14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
mProsser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 96o (1953). Annie
Oakley, the famous woman sharpshooter, brought 5o suits against 50 different news-
papers, all based on the same libelous utterance carried over their wire service. She
is said to have recovered judgments ranging from $500 to $27,500 in 48 of them.
Id. at 969.
16"It scarcely needs pointing out that it is potentially disastrous today, when a
periodical such as Life, is distributed ot some 3,9oo,00o individual readers, and the
Hooper rating indicates that a single radio program is heard by as many as ten
million listeners. The sum total of the causes of action which might thus arise
would be more than three times as great as the estimated number of all the reported
law decisions in the English language, and the lifetime of this generation would not
suffice to try them." Id. at 961.
